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Abstract: This study estimates the predicted impact of climate change on levels of violence in a 
sample of 57 countries. We sample western and non-western countries and perform a multilevel 
ARFIMA regression to examine if warmer temperatures are associated with higher levels of 
homicide. Our results indicate that each degree Celsius increase in annual temperatures is 
associated with a nearly 6% average increase in homicides. Regional variation in this predicted 
effect is detected, for example, with no apparent effects in former Soviet countries and far 
stronger effects found in Africa. This variation indicates that climate change may acutely 
increase violence in areas that already are affected by higher levels of homicides and other social 
dislocations.  
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1. Introduction1 
Although an increasing body of work examines the link between climate change and intergroup 
conflict, the connection between climate change and interpersonal violence has received scant 
attention from scholars (Abbott 2008; Barnett 2003; Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Buhaug, 
Gleditsch and Theisen 2008; Tol and Wagner 2010; Landis 2014; Hsiang and Burke 2014; 
Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013). Existing studies, however, generally find significant positive 
relationships between interpersonal violence and climate change (Landis 2014; Rotton and Cohn 
2003; Anderson, Bushman and Groom 1997; Ranson 2014; Mares 2013a; Mares 2013b). 
Unfortunately, many of the studies that examine interpersonal violence are limited to Western 
countries, especially the United States (c.f., Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013; Blakeslee and 
Fishman 2014; Ikegaya, and Suganami 2008). Moreover, violence and climate change are often 
measured in radically different manners making it difficult to draw comparisons between studies 
and estimate how climate change may affect levels of interpersonal violence worldwide. Our 
study seeks to a assuage some of this criticism. First, we use a broad sample of countries and a 
stable cross-national measure of violence to examine the likely 'global' impact of climate change 
on violence. Second, our study explores if climatic effects are context-dependent. Mares (2013a), 
for instance, found that temperature increases play no apparent role in levels of violence in 
affluent neighborhoods, but in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods a strong positive 
association between rising temperatures and violence was detected. In this study, we examine if 
such effects may also exists across countries.  
We examine 57 countries, and discover a significant positive relationship between 
climate change and homicides, even after controlling for a variety of socio-economic factors. 
Our overall model suggests that 'globally' for each degree Celsius increase in annual 
temperatures in a typical country, homicides on average are predicted to increase by about 5.9%. 
Once countries are separated by region, however, results diverge. We note particularly strong 
effects in Africa, but did not find significant results for Europe, Asia and former Soviet 
countries. Our results support prior research about the link between climate change and violence, 
however, we also find that climate change likely does not affect levels of violence equally across 
countries.  
 
2. Review of Previous Research 
The link between warmer temperatures and interpersonal violence has been studied since the 
19th century (Quetelet 1842). Although theoretical differences about the causal mechanisms 
between heat and violence persist, many studies find support for the two most commonly 
measured explanatory models, Routine Activities Theory (RAT) and General Affective 
Aggression Model (GAAM) (Felson and Cohen 1979; Anderson et al. 2000). RAT theory 
explains that increasing temperatures likely increases the frequency of interactions between 
people, thereby raising the number of violent encounters (Baumer and Wright 1996; Breetzke 
and Cohn 2011; Ceccato 2005; Cohn and Rotton 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005; Hipp, Bauer and 
Curran 2004 Lebeau 1990; Lebeau and Corcoran 1994; Lebeau and Langworthy 1986; Farrell 
and Pease 1994; Rotton and Cohn 2000; 2003). This theory suggests, for instance, that during 
pleasant temperatures people exit their homes and go to bars or restaurants where they are more 
likely to encounter others. All things being equal, increased encounters should increase violent 
interactions.  
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GAAM builds on previous heat-aggression theories and explains increases in violence as 
a result of heightened aggressive emotions brought on by warmer conditions (Anderson 1989; 
Anderson and Anderson 1998; Anderson, Anderson, Dorr and DeNeve 2000; Baron 1972; Baron 
and Bell 1976; Bell and Baron 1976; Kenrick and MacFarlane 1986; Reifman, Larrick and Fein 
1991). In this theory, heat raises irritability levels, which leads to increased aggressiveness.  
 Research has found overwhelming evidence for a positive relationship between violence 
and temperature. Most of this prior research, however, examines 'seasonality effects', specifically 
focusing on how violence varies over months, weeks, or even hours (Hipp, Bauer and Curran 
2004). Therefore, many of these studies really focus on ‘weather’ and few have specifically 
studied the link between climate change and violence. Nonetheless, the few studies that focus on 
climate change also generally report strong associations between rising temperatures and 
violence (Cohn and Rotton 2003; Anderson and DeLisi 2011, Mares 2013b; Ranson 2014).  
The causal links between climate change and violence may be more complex than 
examining temperature and violence levels over time. Climate change may increase violence in 
multiple indirect ways. Anderson and DeLisi (2011) suggest that beyond direct heat effects, 
growing malnutrition may prime individuals for higher levels of aggression. Furthermore, they 
suggest that higher levels of ‘eco’ migration and growing social conflict may contribute to 
increases in homicides. Agnew (2011) likewise fingers higher than usual temperatures and food 
shortages in raising crime levels, but also suggests that growing inequality and poverty triggered 
by climate induced economic instability may contribute to an increase in violence.  
 There may be many ways in which climate change can affect violence. Empirically 
speaking, it is wise to clarify which effects are most likely and find some support in recent 
research on violence. To wit, many studies question the link between migration and crime with 
many recent studies finding significant negative relationships (Martinez 2014). It also remains 
unclear whether natural disasters, such as hurricanes push up crime rates (Zahran et al. 2009; 
Varano et al. 2010). Social conflict may increase as a result of climate change (Hsiang, Burke, 
Miguel 2011, 2013), but that does not necessarily mean that growing social conflict increases 
interpersonal violence. While some have linked decreases in state ‘legitimacy’ (LaFree and 
Tseloni 2006) to increases in violence, there generally appears little support for brutalization 
effects related to wars (Mares 2009). Finally, a long line of research has linked various, but not 
all, aspects of economic growth (or decline) to increases in violence (Messner and Rosenfeld 
1997; LaFree and Tseloni 2006).  
 Given the support for the link between temperature and violence, it stands to reason that 
this will be the primary way in which climate change will affect violence, at least in the 
foreseeable future. This is not say that other more indirect elements play no role, or that the 
relative contribution of other factors may not change as climate change becomes more 
pronounced and its social effects spread more broadly. Prior research on weather, climate change 
and violence leads one to expect a similar positive association between indicators of climate 
change (temperature in particular) and violence. Any indirect effects of climate change 
(migration, health, economy, etc.) on violence are likely to be highly context dependent and at 
present, appear somewhat contested in the predicted effect they may have overall levels of 
violence. 
Measuring the actual link between climate change and violence is more complex than 
theorizing about the possible relationships. Studies explicitly examining climate change and 
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violence (or crime more broadly) incorporate climatological measures as proxies for climate 
change (Cohn and Rotton 2003, Anderson & DeLisi 2011; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013; 
Mares 2013a; 2013b; Ranson 2014), but do not incorporate more indirect ways in which climate 
change may affect violence. We suspect that the latter will need to be done in smaller scale 
settings, as it is impractical for the current wave of macro-level studies, including our own, to 
model the many and interactive factors associated with climate change. 
We do expect that the positive association between climate change and violence will 
generally hold in a cross-national study. In the seasonality and violence context, however, 
several studies found that excessive heat can actually reduce violence as people seek shelter from 
extreme heat (Cohn and Rotton 2005). Nonetheless, this effect is criticized in the literature as 
well (Bushman, Wang, Anderson 2005a, 2005b). In the context of climate change, such 
‘curvilinear’ effects may need to be reexamined as climate change is predicted to increase the 
number of extreme heat events (Archer and Rahmstorf 2010; Karl Melillo and Peterson 2009). In 
a cross-national study, however, such effects are unlikely to appear as the resolution of climate 
and violence data is insufficient.  
While issues surrounding measurement and curvilinear effects cannot be easily resolved 
given current available data, there are two problems in the climate change literature that can be 
addressed. One issue is the spatial bias of current research, which has primarily examined data 
from the United States. Even the most comprehensive meta-analysis by Hsiang, Burke and 
Miguel (2013) is affected by this spatial bias as the majority of the studies in their analysis are 
from the United States or Europe. We suspect that certain types of homicides, particularly those 
more likely to occur outdoors are more susceptible to warming temperatures. 
 A related issue that emerges from current research is whether climate change affects 
violence equally across space. Several studies examining seasonality factors indicate that crime 
and violence fluctuate with a higher seasonal amplitude in more economically depressed 
communities (Ceccato 2005). In the context of climate change, Mares (2013a) finds that 
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods experience a stronger and more significant 
association between rising temperatures and violence. It is unknown, however, if such 
differential impacts can be found at higher levels of aggregation.  
 In the following sections, we address two aspects of the climate change–violence 
relationships that have not yet been adequately explored. First, we sample a large number of 
countries and estimate the predicted country-level impact of climate change on homicides. In 
doing so, we develop a more refined estimate of the link between violence and climate change. 
Because prior research indicates that different places respond differently to climatic effects, we 
also examine if there is any variation in this relationship across regions. Based on prior research, 
we expect to find a generally positive association between our indicators of climate change and 
violence. However, we also find it likely that the effects of climate change may vary 
substantially across groups of countries. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The current study relies on several data sources in order to make a more accurate prediction of 
the likely link between climate change and violence.2 Different types of offenses may respond 
uniquely to climatic shifts. Previous studies that use a full range of violent offenses (typically, 
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homicide, rape, assault and robbery) find strongest results for assaults and sometimes find non-
significant results for homicides (Rotton and Cohn 2003; Ranson 2014; Mares 2013b). Assaults 
and robberies are a good indicator of trends of violence within one country, but using them as an 
indicator for violence is problematic in an international context. Both are often underreported, 
and definitions of assaults vary across legal boundaries reducing the consistency of the measure. 
Homicide is less beset by definitional problems and is generally regarded as a stable 
indicator of trends in violence across space and time (Rosenfeld and Messner 1997; Mares 2009; 
Ouimet and Montmagny-Grenier 2014; Liem et al. 2013). For cross-national research, homicide 
is the most valid indicator of violence because it is most likely to be consistently reported, 
detected and defined. Because homicides correlate very well with trends in other violent crimes 
they are often used as a predictor for violent crime trends in general (Rosenfeld 2000). This 
means that a positive relationship between climate change and homicide likely indicates a 
positive relationship between climate change and violence in general. For this study, therefore, 
homicides data from the United Nations (UN) are utilized. In most cases, those data are collected 
from law enforcement sources, thus representing criminal homicides (excluding defensive use of 
force and police killings). The data are limited in time, covering a relatively short time period 
between 1995 and 2012. For some countries missing data reduce this time frame even further. 
The database on countries is comprised of data for 57 countries that have enough annual 
homicides on which to conduct our analysis.3 More information about the way in which the data 
were gathered and analyzed is available in the Appendix and the supplementary materials. 
 Temperature data were collected from the Global Historical Climatology Network 
(GHCN) operated by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
Rather than using national estimates for average annual temperatures, we use annual 
temperatures from one or several populous cities for each country. This approach mirrors that 
taken by Rotton and Cohn (2003) and Anderson and DeLisi (2011). Given that violent crimes are 
typically heavily concentrated in urban places, it would not be correct to use nationally averaged 
temperature data. Temperature data from large urban centers, in which homicides occur in 
greater concentrations, are therefore more relevant to examine the linkages between temperature 
increases and violence.4 Ideally, we would explore the relationship between city homicide and 
city climate data, but the lack of urban specific homicide data severely restricts our sample size.  
 One may suggest that our timeframe is too short to measure climate change, and to some 
extent that is correct. Our goal, however, is to explore the potential link between climate change 
and violence, not to show the existence of climate change. While it is impossible to fully 
attribute any specific yearly temperature changes to either climate change or typical natural 
variation, we are confident that the number of years in combination with the large number of 
countries should be sufficient to explore the likely nature of the relationship. Hsiang, Burke and 
Miguel (2013) received criticism because many of the studies in their meta-analysis on climate 
change and violence use temperature data as a proxy for climate change. Two of the authors 
(Hsiang and Burke 2014) recently defended the use of such data. We concur with those authors 
that the experience of climate change is a continuous event. In addition, offenders likely do not 
care if the weather conditions they experience prior to offending are (in part) the result of climate 
change or normal variation; it is relatively warm, or it is not. By coupling the experience of 
specific climatic conditions to offending patterns we can extrapolate – if we know the overall 
contribution of climate change during a specific time period – how much of this offending is 
likely attributable to climate change (Dell, Jones and Olken 2014). Although temperature data 
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are sometimes available at the monthly level, we were unable to capitalize on such data for this 
study as most countries only report annual homicide data. We do not feel this is a major setback, 
as studies using either monthly or annual data have yielded similar results (Mares 2013a, 2013b; 
Ranson 2014; Cohn and Rotton 2003, Anderson and DeLisi 2011).  
 Our study controls for several effects that are known to likely alter homicide levels.5 
World Bank data were examined to provide contextual information, including population, social, 
economic and health indicators. Population data were used to create country specific homicide 
rates, which were subsequently log transformed to normalize their distribution. 
 Control factors included in our final models are the consumer price index, male youth 
unemployment, infant mortality (per 1,000), immigrant population (percent of total), and 
casualties of war (per 100,000). While we would have preferred to include additional measures 
beyond those explored here, doing so would have meant excluding more sites from our study, or 
allow multicollinearity to influence our results.6 Recent work on climate change also cautions 
against including too many control variables, particularly if there is concern that these controls 
themselves are influenced by climate change (Dell, Jones and Olken 2014). 
 The countries included in the study are not a random sample, but rather a convenience 
sample of available data.7 Developed countries typically have better recording practices, 
meaning their data are more easily available then that of developing countries. The results of our 
analysis are therefore not fully representative of all countries. Our current sample is somewhat 
biased toward developed countries, which is fairly typical for cross-national studies of violence 
(Liem et al. 2013; Mares 2009). Of 57 countries, six are from Africa, thirteen from Latin 
America, and ten from Asia. While not global in the true meaning of the word, our current 
sample incorporates a diverse group of countries that comprise a substantial portion of the total 
global population (over 3 billion). What is more, the countries in the sample display temperature 
increases in line with expected global land surface temperature anomalies (see Figure 1). We 
therefore believe our estimate reveals the typical effects that countries are likely to experience.  
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
3.1 Methodology and Estimation Technique 
We have a repeated cross-sectional (RCS) dataset, since our dataset consists of 57 countries over 
seventeen years. To test our theoretical expectations, we utilize a multilevel, ARFIMA 
regression with varying slopes and intercepts. Multilevel models (MLMs) allow us to model 
homicide rates at the country and time levels simultaneously. Had we utilized a traditional fixed-
effects model in place of the one reported here, we would only explain variance in homicide 
rates across countries while accounting for the time-series nature of the data.8 However, the data 
also contain variation in homicide rates within countries. The traditional fixed-effects model 
forces us to exclude an important source of variance in our dependent variable: homicide rates 
within countries (see Gelman and Hill 2007; Lebo and Weber 2015). Since our goal is to explain 
variance in homicide rates while fully leveraging the RCS dataset, MLMs are a better approach. 
A multilevel model with varying slopes and intercepts fully capitalizes on the structure of 
this dataset, since the systematic variance in homicide rates comes from two primary sources: 
countries and time. A multilevel model also allows us to capitalize on the RCS dataset, where 
7 
 
heterogeneity exists between and within time-points (Lebo and Weber 2015, 244). If we solely 
relied upon multilevel modeling with an OLS regression, though, we would not sufficiently 
account for the time-series component of our dataset (Lebo and Weber 2015).9 More specifically, 
we would not adequately consider the problems presented by autocorrelation, nor would we 
model dynamic and static processes within the same equation. The ARFIMA-MLM technique 
allows us to capitalize on the RCS structure of our dataset while considering the issues unique to 
time-series data by filtering out temporal and serial autocorrelation using ARFIMA models.  
As applied to this dataset, this technique proceeds in five parts. First, we create annual 
means for the country-level data for each of the dependent (Yt) and independent variables (Xt) 
(Lebo and Weber 2015). Second, we discover the proper noise levels for these dependent and 
independent variables, as well as, for the units of time (Zt) that do not vary across years (Lebo 
and Weber 2015). Third, we filter each (X, Y and Z) through its noise model to create units of 
time series that are free of autocorrelation (Lebo and Weber 2015). Fourth, we remove yearly 
deterministic components from our country-level data (Lebo and Weber 2015). Finally, we 
estimate our MLM “in two levels using the double-filtered data” (Lebo and Weber 2015, 246). 
This estimation technique (ARFIMA-MLM) provides at least two additional advantages. 
First, it fixes problems of serial autocorrelation at the country-level by taking deviations across 
individual observations from units of time (Lebo and Weber 2015, 246). Second, this technique 
allows us to include additional time unit variables that do not vary within time-points as 
covariates (Lebo and Weber 2015, 246). Similar to traditional fixed-effects models, ARFIMA-
MLMs also provide fixed-effects coefficients that represent (in our case) within nation 
variance.10 
 
4. Results 
When we combine data for all countries with sufficient information we find that for an average 
country in our data a one degree (Celsius) temperature increase is related to a statistically 
significant average increase in homicides of nearly 6% (see Table 1, for coefficients for all 
variables and Table 2 for specific effect sizes for temperature only). Our control variables show 
that both male youth unemployment and the consumer price index are positively associated with 
increases in homicides (with CPI being statistically significant), suggesting that economic factors 
remain important predictors of homicides. Infant mortality and war casualties, while positively 
related were not significant. Finally, the proportion of migrants in a country shows a non-
significant negative correlation with homicides. The results for all countries in our sample thus 
indicate that climate change is likely to increase the number of homicides worldwide after 
controlling for several important factors previously identified in the literature. We employed 
several alternative model specifications and performed robustness checks and found that results 
held.11 It is particularly noteworthy that removing African countries from the analysis does not 
substantively change our conclusion (the predicted effect decreases marginally from nearly 6 to 
nearly 5%, but remains highly significant). 
 
-Tables1 and 2 about here- 
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  Finding a significant positive association between temperatures and homicide levels is 
consistent with prior research (Anderson Bushman and Groom 1997; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 
2013; Ranson 2014; Rotton and Cohn 2003). Most studies, however, report smaller effects. We 
suspect that the geographic bias, sample size and modeling techniques of prior work have led to 
an underestimate of statistical relation between climate change and violence. Given that a few 
studies indicate that geographic areas may modify the link between temperature and violence we 
conducted our analysis also on regional levels. Here, we find some peculiar results. At the 
regional level we found no significant climatic effects for former Soviet countries (-.30% per 
degree Celsius), statistically insignificant but positive effects for Europe (+ 1.82%), Asia 
(+1.82%) and Latin America (+4.39%), a significant effect for North America, and Australasia 
(+2.85%) and a rather strong relation in Africa (+17.94%). We are not entirely surprised that the 
results for former Soviet countries show no connection to rising temperatures. Murders in these 
countries have been driven by growing alcohol consumption and the growth of organized crime 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (World Health Organization 2006). These two factors 
mean that many homicides are probably not as dependent on weather conditions as nations with 
a higher proportion of street gang killings. 
 Our control variables show some variability across regions, but some general patterns 
emerge. The two most interesting results are found in variables "Price Index" and "Migrants". 
For consumer price index the results indicate good support for a positive association, indicating 
that large annual jumps in prices of products may be linked to increases in homicides. Price 
increase in consumer goods may trigger a rise in violence in several ways but most likely 
indicates increases of financial strains of vulnerable populations (Pratt and Godsey 2003). 
Changes in youth unemployment also are generally positively associated with increases in 
homicides. This is not entirely unsurprising; as young people fail to make inroads in the labor 
market alternative avenues are often explored, including associations with street gangs, for 
instance (Wilson 1987; Anderson 1999; Venkatesh 2006). Such associations are likely to 
increase a young person’s changes to become the victim or offender in a homicide incident 
(Decker and van Winkle 1996). 
Our results favor a negative association between migration and homicide rates. Given 
that international migration is typically undertaken to seek out educational and labor 
opportunities it should not be surprising that the proportion of immigrants is negatively 
associated with homicides in some regions (Stowell, Messner and McGeever 2009; Wadsworth 
2010). 
 While our results indicate a significant connection between climate change and homicide, 
there are large regional differences in the magnitude of this effect ranging from no discernable 
connections (former Soviet countries) to insignificant positive effects (Latin America, Europe, 
Asia), to significant positive correlations (Africa, North America/Australia/New Zealand). We 
suspect that the reasons for this variability may be highly context dependent. The regions that 
show greatest support for the link between climate change and homicide are characterized by 
higher proportions of street violence, perhaps indicating that countries with higher levels of street 
violence are more likely to experience increasing levels of violence as temperatures increase. 
 We suspect that the prevalence of certain types of homicides – such as a higher 
proportion of outdoor killings – are not simply driven by geography and prevailing climates, but 
are also related to structural social and economic inequalities. Ouiemet (2012) suggests that 
countries with higher homicides levels are also likely to experience a greater degree of income 
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inequality. We believe that countries with higher levels of social and economic inequities 
produce the conditions (unemployment, educational failure) which promote outdoor activities 
among at-risk groups (young disenfranchised males). Obviously we cannot be certain about such 
an explanation since we are not able to test this directly in our data. We encourage researchers to 
examine disaggregated homicide data from various sites and examine their variability in greater 
detail. 
 We tested all of the models in Table 1 under many alternative specifications and 
conditions to verify the robustness of the findings. To begin, we employed both a traditional 
fixed-effects and multilevel analysis; results did not substantively change. Next we used our 
reported model and removed one year at a time and found that results remain largely unchanged. 
We also removed one country at a time and again discovered little change in the results. Finally, 
we removed one control variable at a time and the results remain substantially unchanged. 12, 13 
 
5. Limitations 
Our study uses annual temperatures as a proxy to measure climate change, but temperature is but 
one element in a changing climate. Our study did not examine seasonal factors, precipitation or 
extreme weather events. While previous research acknowledges the importance of incorporating 
other measures of climate change, incorporating them in the current study proved problematic. 
Precipitation changes, for instance, may impact rates of violence but it makes a theoretical 
difference if the precipitation comes in short heavy downpours or in protracted event. Using 
aggregated annual data makes it impossible to discern the type of precipitation events 
experienced by our sample countries. Similarly, aggregated data make it difficult to discern if 
very hot summers are responsible for increases in homicides as the homicides may have 
increased evenly throughout the year or may have even spiked during winter months. 
Unfortunately the resolution of cross-national homicide data is limited to annual records. 
Substantial primary data collection would be needed to address this issue. 
 Although homicide is probably the best cross-national and longitudinal measure of 
violence, minor differences across contexts exist (Mares 2009). For instance, what is considered 
legal self-defense in the United States may be considered a homicide in the Netherlands. We do 
not believe that such definitional and reporting differences would account for more than a small 
percentage of differences across countries. For our study, a more important issue is sample bias. 
Although our study is currently the broadest sample available, it oversamples developed 
countries. This is largely because developed countries have better data recording practices. Given 
the resulting model differences we can observe between more developed and developing 
countries we believe the predicted overall climate change effects on violence may be higher if 
we had been able to collect a more complete sample. For instance, if one excludes African 
countries from the analysis the correlation coefficient for temperature changes from .056 to .048 
(but remains significant). Relatedly, it is also important to remember that the unit of analysis in 
our study is the country, meaning that our estimated 'climate change effect' on violence is not a 
'global' average, but rather the averaged country-specific impact. An average 5.9% increase in 
homicides in the countries in our study may mean that India's increase may be only 1.9%, but 
Ireland's increase may be 9.9%. Given the large population differences between the two 
countries one quickly realizes that it is impossible from this study to reliably estimate the likely 
additional homicides generated by climate change.  
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 The results of this study could likely be improved by examining homicide and climatic 
data at the city level. Unfortunately such data are rather limited at present and would require 
substantial data collection efforts. Another issue is that we are unable to directly test existing 
theories that explain the link between warmer temperatures and violence. It would be important 
to understand if warmer temperatures directly (GAAM) or indirectly influence violence (RAT). 
Again, the problem lies in the level of aggregation of the data. For instance, we cannot say if the 
link discovered is the result of warmer winter temperatures or warmer summer temperatures (or 
both). Also, since we have no information on the type of homicide incidents and locations in 
which they occurred it is not an ideal data set to test specific theoretical aspects of the heat-
violence link. For this, we encourage researchers to employ data at lower levels of aggregation. 
 We also cannot offer any direct explanations for the differences in regional models. 
These differences are no doubt very context dependent and would have to be explored with 
smaller scale data. We suspect that further disaggregation of homicides may prove fruitful as it 
may uncover whether regional differences persist once similar types of homicides are compared.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Although our study confirms the results of several recent studies by finding largely positive 
relationships between climate change and interpersonal violence, our study did so using a larger 
sample of countries. Results indicate that ‘globally’ an average annual increase of one degree 
Celsius is related to a 5.9% average increase in national homicide rates. Our results further 
indicate that the strength and significance of this relationship varies substantially from region to 
region. Some regions show no significant link between warming and homicides (especially 
former Soviet countries), others show quite a large connection (particularly African countries). 
We suspect that the regional variation may rests –in part– on prevailing types of homicides in 
each region. Prior research, indicates that certain types of homicides are less influenced by a 
changing climate. For instance, homicides in street settings are more likely influenced by 
climatic variations, while homicides in a domestic context (and typically occur indoors) are less 
likely impacted by variation in climatic conditions. Nonetheless, since no contextual indicators 
are currently available for cross-national homicide data, we cannot be certain that our idea is a 
valid explanation for the regional variation. 
 Unfortunately our study unveils, like many others examining the societal impacts of 
climate change, that those countries and people who have contributed less to current levels of 
atmospheric greenhouse gasses, are predicted to experience the most negative impacts. We 
certainly encourage more research on this topic. As the evidence accumulates that climate 
change is likely to contribute to higher rates of interpersonal violence, many new questions 
emerge that cannot be adequately answered by national and international level data, but will 
require the use of high resolution local studies.  
 
 
1 The authors would like to thank the supportive criticism of the anonymous reviewers. 
2 Please refer to the supplementary materials for more details on the data and analysis. 
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3 Many smaller countries with infrequent homicides and a small population were excluded. 
Please see the Appendix for more details. 
4 The Appendix outlines the practical steps we took to select sites and temperature readings. 
5 Baseline models with temperature as the only independent variable are available in the 
Appendix. 
6 The Appendix furnishes additional information on all variables, including a correlation matrix 
between the dependent variable and all independent variables. The Appendix also includes 
several independent variables that we did not use in the models reported here. Moreover, we 
provide a selection of models that include at least some of these independent variables in the 
Appendix. 
7 Countries included in our sample: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belgium, Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. 
8 We estimated a fixed effects models using the same independent variables as those contained in 
Table One. The results are substantially similar to those that are reported here, and are contained 
in the Appendix. 
9 We estimated a multilevel model, without using the ARFIMA technique using the same 
independent variables as those contained in Table 1. The results are substantially similar to those 
that are reported here, and are contained in the Appendix.  
10 For more precise calculations of unit and standard deviation change effects, please refer to the 
supplementary materials. 
11 The supplemental materials provide more information about and the specific results of the 
models referenced in this paragraph. 
12 Some of these results are modeled in the Appendix (i.e., country/year fixed effects and 
removing one control variable at a time), or are contained in the supplemental materials. 
13 These same robustness checks were run on the fixed effects and multilevel modeling (without 
ARFIMA) techniques that are referenced in earlier parts of this paper. The results are strikingly 
similar to those that are reported here. 
